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Abstract: Taking as an example Xi Jinping’s use of the phrase “excel-
lent traditional culture” (Ո⿰Ր㔏᮷ॆ, youxiu chuantong wenhua), this 
article looks at the construction of a centrally sanctioned narrative of 
traditional Chinese culture in resources produced within the Party 
school system. The specific focus of analysis is on how these re-
sources theorise the functionality of traditional culture for the Chine-
se Communist Party (CCP) as a political organisation, and what cul-
ture-based solutions they put forward to tackle the problems with 
Party theory and ideology, the state governance model, and cadre 
performance. It is argued that by referencing traditional culture, and, 
in particular, by drawing on traditional moral virtues, the CCP re-
aligns itself with societal expectations without making concessions 
over the ideological foundations of the party state. 
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,QWURGXFWLRQ
While much attention has been given to why the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) adduces Chinese philosophical notions in state policies 
(Lu 2010; Callahan 2013; Delury 2008; Mahoney 2008) and why it 
imbues propaganda messages with cultural symbols (Brady 2012; 
Perry 2013; Clausen 1998), our understanding of how the CCP actu-
ally goes about transforming Chinese tradition into a politically useful 
resource is currently very limited. This is despite the fact that since 
his selection as Party leader, Xi Jinping has shown an ongoing com-
mitment to advocating China’s cultural and philosophical heritage as 
a meaningful resource for improving the performance of the CCP 
(Buckley 2014a; Brown 2015; Xinhua 2016a; Zhang 2015). Xi has 
called on examples from ancient philosophy and political practice to 
put forward proposals for cadre management and anti-corruption 
measures (Angle and Zhang 2013; Anderlini 2017; Schuman 2015). 
Following his instructions, the CCP has drawn on classical philosoph-
ical notions to revamp its governance model (Xinhua 2014, 2016b). 
Despite the Party’s programmatic anti-traditionalism in the past, Xi 
now symbolically depicts the CCP as the rightful beneficiary of and 
successor to China’s cultural traditions (Tatlow 2018; Buckley 2014b).  
This evident mining of cultural content by the CCP is commonly 
interpreted as an intervention aimed at manufacturing and maintain-
ing popular support for the Party, a core priority for it in the twenty-
first century. No longer sustainably validated by Marxist ideology, the 
CCP urgently needs to reinvent the sources of its legitimacy (Holbig 
and Gilley 2010a; Laliberte and Lanteigne 2008; Yang 1996). The 
purposeful downplaying of ideology to facilitate the kick-starting of 
post–Mao Zedong economic reforms caused a serious dent in the 
Party’s original source of legitimacy, leaving it without a cogent theo-
retical system to justify its right to rule (Misra 1998; Chen 1995; 
Heberer and Schubert 2006; Wang and Zheng 2000). From 1978 
onwards, the CCP instead relied on a mix of performance factors 
linked to economic transformation. The increase in wealth, the im-
provements in the living standards of the population, and the provi-
sion of limited social infrastructure produced significant levels of 
support for the authoritarian regime (Wright 2010; Zhao and Yang 
2013; Twohey 1999; Chen 1997). Nationalist sentiment, particularly 
the strand of it fuelled by cultural nostalgia, further strengthened the 
CCP’s position (Zhao 1998; Guo 2016, 2004; Béja 1995).  
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As the legitimacy-inducing potential of performance factors has 
become depleted, the CCP has resorted to new methods of legitima-
cy-building and new sources of legitimation. Economics and national-
ism, the previous building blocks of the CCP’s legitimacy model, have 
been gradually replaced by ideological and institutional content sup-
plemented by collective values, culturalism, and governance (Holbig 
and Gilley 2010b). On the one hand, the Party has reformulated and 
widened its tired foundational doctrine to retain critical levels of ideo-
logical legitimacy (Gore 2003; Holbig 2009; Gilley and Holbig 2009; 
Zeng 2016; Klimeš 2018). It has introduced institutional develop-
ments and structural reforms which regularise political mechanisms 
and increase citizen participation in policymaking and local politics 
(Ho 2011; Gilley 2008; Schubert 2008). By improving the efficacy of 
policy implementation, reforming bureaucratic structures, and en-
hancing cadre performance the Party has significantly improved its 
levels of popular support (Saich 2016; Schubert 2008: 198, 2014; 
Zeng 2014). On the other hand, the CCP increasingly references 
Chinese culture – which signals that the party state recognises its 
potential as a functional political asset (Makeham 2009; Billioud 2007; 
Hu 2007; Bell 2010, 2015; Ford 2015).  
However, this article 1  argues that the Party does not simply 
bandwagon on the growing popularity of tradition, but rather that it 
strategically selects and exploits the specific attributes which charac-
terise the Chinese polity across temporal and ideological spectra: the 
culturally formed understanding of political authority and regime 
legitimacy (Huang 2013; Shue 2004; Tong 2011; Zhao 2009; Guo 
2003; Chen 2011); the conjunction of moral instruction and the exer-
cise of political power (Huang and Zürcher 1993; Thornton 2007; 
Lee 1996; Li et al. 2004); or, the flexibility of political practice paired 
with the existence of a distinctive ideological core of a regime (Pines 
2012; Antony and Leonard 2002; Heilmann and Perry 2011; Sham-
baugh 2008a). This new legitimacy-building strategy of the CCP can 
be given conceptual form by using Schubert’s idea of “zones of legit-
imacy” (Schubert 2008). He suggests that support for the CCP does 

1 The author greatly benefitted in writing this article from comments by Profes-
sor Sam Crane, Dr. Jérôme Doyon, Yuanyuan Liu, Dylan Loh, Jean Christo-
pher Mittelstaedt, Dr. Giorgio Strafella, Prof. Gerda Wielander, and two ano-
nymous reviewers. Special thanks are due to Dr. Phil Entwistle and Dr. Michael 
Gow for their valuable suggestions and friendly encouragement. 
  50 Aleksandra Kubat 

not have a single origin, but comes rather from pockets of legitimacy-
building across various geographical, administrative, or ideational 
spaces. Aggregated together, these dispersed “partial legitimacies” 
generate critical levels of legitimacy for the CCP. By drawing on such 
a mix of diverse legitimising factors, the CCP widens its support base 
and produces a multilayered structure of legitimacy which helps the 
Party to withstand periods of decreased popularity. Traditional cul-
ture, in other words, is becoming a significant zone of legitimacy for 
the CCP. 
Under Xi, the bid for legitimacy has gained yet another pivotal 
dimension: the Party employs Chinese tradition to assert its unique 
status and reaffirm its right to rule, and it does so also within its own 
ranks. This specific facet of legitimacy, where the act of legitimation is 
aimed at the regime itself, was dubbed by the scholar of political rhet-
oric Rodney Barker the “self-legitimation of rulers” (Barker 2001). He 
pointed out that a regime’s active approach to cultivating its specific 
political identity and justifying its right to rule has significance not 
only for the subjects but also for the regime itself (for example, for 
the governmental ethos). Building upon Barker’s observation, this 
paper contends that Xi’s tenure marks a new stage in the CCP’s ap-
proach to traditional Chinese culture. Previously relegated to the role 
of an ideological foe, traditional culture is now being appreciated as a 
political asset. Most notably, immersion in traditional culture is pro-
posed as a means of political rectification for Party members and 
cadres – which suggests that Chinese tradition has been granted a 
mandate to directly influence the very core of the values approved of 
and promoted by the party state.   
To offset the imbalance in our understanding of how the CCP 
institutes tradition as a political resource, this paper reconstructs the 
operationalisation of the term “excellent traditional culture” (Ո⿰Ր
㔏᮷ॆ, youxiu chuantong wenhua; hereafter, YCW) in articles published 
by authors and/or journals officially affiliated with Party schools in 
the years from 2012 to 2017. Before the 18th Party Congress, this 
term was one of many generic phrases used to refer to Chinese 
tradition; however, since 2012 it has appeared regularly as a coherent 
part of the official discourse of the party state. Specific to Xi’s time in 
office, it allows us to distinguish his narrative on tradition from the 
culture-related discourses of his predecessors and references to tradi-
tion by the Chinese communist movement. In contrast to other terms 
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in use, YCW has no academic, disciplinary, or prior political connota-
tions and is applied only domestically. As such, this operationalisation 
is considered an authoritative exposition of how the CCP under the 
leadership of Xi sanctions the role of tradition in contemporary pub-
lic, political, and Party life. 
The choice of Party school articles as the resources for analysis 
was motivated by the ubiquitous role of Party schools in the shaping 
of the communist cadre corps. Their continuous and intimate link to 
political processes makes them, and in particular the elite-level institu-
tions such as the Central Party School (CPS), a mirror reflecting the 
most current trends within the Party itself (Mattis 2012; Zheng 2010: 
150–175; Shambaugh 2008b). Although the institutionalisation of 
learning processes within the Party still follows a vertical, top-down 
pattern (Tsai and Dean 2013: 96–100; Miller 2015: 5–6), the content 
of cadre training and education – once defined solely by ideological 
dogma – is increasingly influenced by marketisation and commerciali-
sation (Pieke 2009, 2007; Lee 2010) as well as being receptive to real-
time occurrences and real-life circumstances (Liu 2009; Wibowo and 
Fook 2006). Cadre training and education can thus be construed as a 
space wherein political ideas are formed, rehearsed, and played out 
(Guo and Shan 2009). As such, it provides a unique window through 
which the political ideas of the central leadership – as well as the 
rationale behind them – can be investigated. In the case of this paper, 
resources produced by Party schools are understood to adequately 
represent the official line of the CCP regarding cultural revival and to 
provide a working definition of this trend for the Party’s internal use 
as well as for consumption by cadres. 
The article begins by looking at how the analysed articles define 
YCW, and how they attempt to establish the associated narrative’s 
philosophical and political credentials. It then proceeds to explore 
how these articles diagnose the areas of political contention, and 
which YCW-based solutions they propose as a means of tackling 
them. Discussion of these solutions focuses on two areas: proposals 
for the CCP as a political organisation and proposals for the CCP 
cadre corps.      
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'DWD
Articles for analysis were identified using the China Network 
Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). This Chinese-language database 
provides the biggest and most systematic catalogue of publications of 
the affiliate institutions of the CCP and the Chinese government – 
including cadre training institutions. Drawing on such a large pool of 
data allows for the minimising of selection bias.  
The selection procedure involved three steps. The first was two-
fold, and consisted of a search for the term Ո⿰Ր㔏᮷ॆ (youxiu 
chuantong wenhua, excellent traditional culture) in the article title, and 
the word ފṑ (dangxiao, Party school) in the full article text for an 
explicit statement on the Party school affiliation of author and/or 
journal. This procedure was dictated by the specificity of the data-
base, which does not provide a search category for Party schools or 
cadre training institutions – but does nevertheless allow for the iden-
tification of the Party school affiliation of authors and journals in the 
search results. In the second step, the timeframe of 2012–2017 was 
applied to the existing selection of articles, yielding 276 items (the 
final search was carried out mid-April 2017). The third and final step 
included the manual identification of articles published in Party 
school journals and/or written by authors identified by their institu-
tional affiliation with such a school. The final selection consisted of 
94 articles whose content was subsequently coded for analysis using 
NVivo. To economise space, in the following text roman numerals 
will replace articles’ full titles. 
In the final selection, 61 articles were authored by individuals 
with an official Party school affiliation, 17 were published in Party 
school journals, and 16 conformed to both criteria. Seventeen articles 
specifically discussed traditional Chinese culture in the context of 
improving the Party or Party cadres (as measured by keywords in the 
title and abstract). As demonstrated by the yearly distribution pre-
sented in Figure 1 below, in the analysed period the number of rele-
vant articles increased exponentially – reaching a maximum of 30 in 
2015. Three articles were published in the first quarter of 2017, when 
the database search was carried out. In the preceding decade, between 
one and three relevant articles were published per year. 
The geographical and administrative distribution of authors’ in-
stitutional affiliations reveal no significant patterns. Almost all admin-
istrative levels are represented. City-level Party schools (40 counts) 
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are the most often listed institutions of affiliation, followed by pro-
vincial (19), county (9), district (5), and prefecture-level Party schools 
(2). Central-level institutions, specified as the affiliation of 13 authors, 
include the CPS (9), Yan’an Leadership Academy (2), Central History 
Research Office (1), and Central Literature Research Office (1). 
Among 17 authors with university affiliations, two are from Renmin 
University of China, one from Peking University, three from universi-
ties across Shandong Province, and three from Shanghai-based uni-
versities.  
)LJXUH 'LVWULEXWLRQRI$UWLFOHV,GHQWLILHGE\WKH3KUDVHՈ⿰Ր㔏᮷ॆ
±

6RXUFH $XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSLODWLRQ
The most frequently featured journals in the final dataset, both at 
four counts, are the Journal of the Jinan Municipal Party School (⍾ইᐲފ
ṑ , Jinan shi dangxio) from Shandong, the home province of many 
ancient Chinese philosophers, and, puzzlingly, a magazine called Chi-
nese Foreign Entrepreneurs (ѝཆԱъᇦ, Zhongwai qiyejia). Among jour-
nals with two or three counts, roughly half are official Party school 
journals; the remainder include publications by other types of party-
state institution such as institutes of socialism (⽮Պѫѹᆖ䲒, shehui 
zhuyi xueyuan), administration colleges (㹼᭯ᆖ䲒, xingzheng xueyuan), 
or economy institutes (㓿⍾ᆖ䲒, jingji xueyuan). Single articles were 
published in Party periodicals such as The Red Banner (㓒ᰇ᮷は , 
Hongqi wengao), China Leadership Science (ѝഭ亶ሬ、ᆖ, Zhongguo lingdao 
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kexue), Party Building (ފᔪ, Dangjian), The Frontline (ࡽ㓯, Qianxian), 
The Science of Leadership Forum (亶ሬ、ᆖ䇪උ, Lingdao kexue luntan), 
Journal for Party and Administrative Cadres (ފ᭯ᒢ䜘ᆖ࠺ , Dangzheng 
ganbu xuekan), Theoretical Horizon (⨶䇪㿶䟾 , Lilun shiye), and Party 
History Research and Findings (ފਢঊ䟷, Dangshi bocai). 
7KH'HILQLWLRQRI<&:
At its most capacious, the term excellent traditional culture is used to 
refer to the sum of the spiritual and material wealth created in the 
historical process of developing traditional Chinese society. Unsur-
prisingly, most attempts to define the term repeat or closely reverber-
ate formulations used by Xi himself. Most commonly, YCW is de-
scribed as the “soul and blood” of China and the “spiritual home of 
Chinese people” which assure the survival of the Chinese nation [V, 
102] [XIII, 83] [XLIV, 33–34]. Despite the general conceptual and 
definitional imprecision, it is possible to discern several themes in 
Xi’s YCW narrative. Most importantly, traditional culture in Xi’s use 
is understood in terms of civilisational heritage as the long-term, un-
interrupted, and cumulative process of the maturation and realisation 
of the inherent potential of the Chinese people [V, 102] [XXVII, 69] 
[XXI, 147–148]. A visible attempt is made to create an image of his-
torical unity and coherence to Chinese society [XXI, 147–148], while 
at the same time underlining also its ethnic and religious diversity 
[XXVII, 72]. The strong relational focus of traditional culture is em-
phasised, pointing to the interdependence between individuals in a 
society – but also between people and the natural world. YCW is also 
defined in terms of “life practice,” as the embodiment and product of 
the everyday efforts and endeavours of ordinary people [XV, 49] – 
possibly in an attempt to create distance between the CCP’s current 
application of tradition and the view of traditional culture as an ossi-
fied theory, political ritual, or elite custom detached from everyday 
life.  
Furthermore, as China’s own endogenous cultural system, YCW 
is seen as predisposed to playing an important role in the nation’s 
contemporary context. First, the current stage of the unveiling of 
tradition is but a new phase of the realisation of its innate energy, 
everlasting potential, and strong formative ability. Second, traditional 
culture – especially Confucianism – is believed to possess a distinct 
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intellectual strength and appeal. It is lauded for its ability to dominate 
over other systems of thought and to create a syncretic intellectual 
system without losing its own specificity. Third, as one author puts it, 
YCW – in particular classical literature – constitutes an inclusive sys-
tem of knowledge which offers a wide margin for interpretation and 
has proven able to produce state-strengthening solutions in the past 
[LV, 68–69].  
Almost universally, authors tend to narrow down traditional cul-
ture to the spiritual domain – and more specifically, the moral do-
main. The propensity to see YCW as a moral doctrine leads to claims 
that it should be seen as a new embodiment of “The Way” (䚃ᗧ, 
daode) [XIII, 83] and a “crystallisation” of humanistic ethics and moral 
philosophy [LIII, 106]. As achieving the moral ideal is intimately 
linked to practice through ritual or education [III, 20], YCW is often 
presented as a repository of practices aiming at the improvement of 
individuals, societies, and their relationship with nature [LXXIX]. 
Importantly, from the perspective of the political functionality of 
YCW, such moral interpretations underline the existence of universal 
order and associated rules of behaviour with specific manifestations 
at the individual, social, and national levels [LV]. In this model, the 
moral potential of individuals is fulfilled by means of “self-cultiva-
tion” (؞ޫ, xiuyang) or “self-strengthening” (㠚ᕪ, ziqiang) [XXXVI, 
124]; social morality is realised through the practice of “filial piety”  
ᆍ, xiao) [III, 19]; at the national level, meanwhile, the moral order is 
exercised through implementing ideals such as “benevolent govern-
ance” (ӱ᭯, renzheng) and “the rule of virtue” (ᗧ⋫, dezheng) [LV]. 
Filial piety plays a particularly important role in the argument for 
transposing the traditional moral hierarchy into modern times: ex-
tended beyond the immediate social setting, it can become the foun-
dation for national-level loyalty and thus become equivalent to mod-
ern-day patriotism [III, 19].  
Two clusters of mutually complementary philosophical concepts 
emerge as core elements of the YCW narrative, professing its strong 
orientation towards the moral and political disciplining of the society. 
The “Doctrine of the Mean” (ѝᓨ, zhongyong), “harmony” (઼䉀, 
hexie), and “benevolence” (ӱ, ren) together comprise the more prom-
inent of the two clusters which appear in the majority of analysed 
articles. The Doctrine of the Mean is understood as an exhortation 
for a conscious, impartial, and balanced approach to reality [III, 19] 
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and as a pivotal influence on the essence of Chineseness – including 
on the specific cognitive patterns and value-orientation of the Chi-
nese people [LXVIII]. It is linked to benevolence (benevolent love), 
the “highest moral realm” in Confucian theory whose realisation 
leads to harmony [XIV, 44]. Harmony, by some authors seen as the 
core value of YCW, represents a holistic approach to human relation-
ships as well as to man’s interaction with nature [XIX, 215]. In an 
arguably more modern interpretation, the ideal of harmony is inher-
ently linked to “civilisational” (᮷᰾, wenming) and “patriotic” (⡡ഭ, 
aiguo) values [XIV].  
The second cluster includes values and ideals which aim to actu-
alise Confucian humanism through politics. It is represented by the 
concept of benevolent governance. While not divorced from the 
advocacy for hierarchical relationships between people, benevolent 
governance promotes “governing for the people” (ᢗ᭯Ѫ≁, zhizheng 
wei min) and thinking about political and public duties as “people-
oriented” or in terms of “people as foundation” (ԕ≁Ѫᵜ, yimin wei 
ben) [LXVI, 54]. As “the highest value goal of Confucian legal cul-
ture,” “people-centred thought” (≁ᵜᙍᜣ , minben sixiang) is thus 
seen as one of the fundaments of state ideology and political culture 
in ancient times [XXXVI, 124]. Its reappearance in contemporary 
political life proves, for some authors, that YCW represents a lineage 
of society-oriented political theory and practice which runs uninter-
rupted from ancient rulers all the way up to the current communist 
leaders [LXXXV]. 
3KLORVRSKLFDO&UHGHQWLDOV
The analysed articles directly and liberally list philosophers, schools of 
thought, canonical texts, and traditional virtues. However, their 
treatment is far from substantial and, at times, even inaccurate. Con-
fucianism, explicitly named as the most important source of YCW, is 
very often paired with two other major cultural traditions of China: 
Taoism and Buddhism. Mohism and Legalism, meanwhile, receive far 
less attention.    
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)LJXUH 5HIHUHQFHWR&KLQHVH7KLQNHUV

6RXUFH $XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSLODWLRQ
Figure 2 above represents the proportion of references made to Con-
fucianism, Daoism, and other philosophical traditions as well as the 
number of instances in which specific thinkers are mentioned. Con-
fucius is by far the most referenced philosopher, accounting for two-
thirds of references among Confucian thinkers. In this group, Dong 
Zhongshu, a Han-era philosopher and promoter of Confucianism as 
official state ideology, receives a surprisingly high number of men-
tions. Among non-Confucian traditions and thinkers, Daoism ac-
counts for almost one-quarter of references – the majority of which 
are to Laozi. Mohist philosopher Mozi, Legalist thinker Han Fei, and 
Sunzi (in the capacity of famous historical figure rather than that of 
philosopher) are mentioned in singular instances.  
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)LJXUH 5HIHUHQFHWR3KLORVRSKLFDO7H[WV

6RXUFH $XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSLODWLRQ. 
As Figure 3 shows, references to philosophical texts follow a pattern 
similar to those to philosophical traditions. The Confucian Analects, 
with 80 mentions, is the most quoted canonical text. Separately, vol-
umes comprising the Five Classics receive almost one-third of all men-
tions. Interestingly, the Book of History is only mentioned by its more 
colloquial title Shangshu and not by the more philosophically adequate 
title Shujing. For non-Confucian texts, only Dao De Jing receives a 
relatively high number of references.  
The treatment of traditional virtues and values is similar to that 
of classical thinkers and canonical texts. The quantity of mentions – 
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with the secondary and even tertiary level of Confucian values being 
listed in analysed texts – does not translate to their quality. In addi-
tion to the above-mentioned benevolence, harmony, and filial piety, 
the following concepts and values receive significant number of 
counts: “great unity” (བྷ਼, datong), “loyalty” (ᘐ, zhong), “respect” (ᜤ, 
gong), “righteousness” (ѹ, yi), “sincerity” (䈊, cheng), “goodness” (㢟, 
liang), and “honesty” (ᓹ, lian). 
3ROLWLFDO&UHGHQWLDOV,7KH&ODVVLFDO8QGHU
SLQQLQJVRI&RPPXQLVW/HJDFLHV
The construction of YCW as a Party-sanctioned narrative requires 
establishing not only its philosophical but also historical and political 
credentials. To that effect, an image is created of tradition as a source 
of inspiration for Party leaders and policies – both contemporarily 
and in the past. Two lines of reasoning can be clearly identified in this 
respect. First, almost all articles depict the CCP as the rightful “inher-
itor” (Ր᢯㘵, chuanchengzhe) or “successor” of past traditions, and a 
willing “carrier” (ᕈᢜ㘵, hongyangzhe) or “promoter” of tradition into 
the future [VIII, 25]. Second, strong emphasis is put on the claim that 
the ideas guiding current Party policies are rooted in classical Chinese 
philosophy and ancient ethical principles.  
This positive stance towards tradition is in most cases corrobor-
ated by tracing the origins of the concepts used by communist leaders 
to express Party policy back to ancient persons, phrases, or philoso-
phies. The slogan “seeking truth from facts” (ᇎһ≲ᱟ, shishi qiushi) 
is discussed as a prime example of the integration of traditional ideas 
into Marxist theory. It is said to originate in the phrase ؞ᆨྭਔ, ሖ
һ≲ᱟ (xiuxue haogu, shishi qiushi; cultivate learning and love the an-
cient, engage in substantive matters and pursuing the true; translation 
following Hunter 2012: 422), first recorded by the Eastern Han dyn-
asty historian Ban Gu to praise rigorous textual study; in Mao’s use, it 
became an epistemological proposition expressing the insistence on 
“seeking” (≲, qiu) the “objective state” (ᇎһ, shishi) and “internal 
logic or essence of phenomena” (ᱟ, shi) [XV, 49]. Mao is said to 
have “excavated” this idea and given it a “scientific explanation” by 
reinterpreting its inherent pursuit of objectivity into radical study and 
thought transformation, useful for establishing the ideological line of 
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the CCP [XV, 49]. It is claimed that throughout the Communist Revo-
lution and the following period of socialist construction the CCP 
aimed to inherit old traditions, as proven by Mao’s comment that 
communist victory will bring about a revival of Chinese culture [LIII, 
102].  
Another Party concept, the “well-off society” (ሿᓧ⽮Պ, xiao-
kang shehui), is traced back to the Book of Poetry phrase “≁Ӗࣣ→, ⊄
ਟሿᓧ” (min yi lao zhi, qi ke xiaokang) rendered by James Legge as: 
“The people indeed are heavily burdened, but perhaps a little ease 
may be got for them.” Originally expressing the objectives of an agri-
cultural society, it was transplanted into the context of an industrialis-
ing society and introduced to Party theory by Deng Xiaoping [XI, 
15]. Furthermore, Jiang Zemin’s theory of “Three Represents” (йњ
ԓ㺘, sange daibiao), focused on development and “keeping up with 
the times,” is based on the passage ㍲ᰕҮҮ, 㠷ᱲڅ㹼 (zhong ri qian 
qian, yu shi xie xing; [an exemplary person] remains diligent and vigor-
ous all day long and changes with time; translation following Zheng 
2017: 208) from the Book of Changes [XI, 15]. Another interpretation 
argues that political ideas, strategies, and goals at the core of Jiang’s 
concept derive from traditional Chinese notions such as: “the people 
are the root of a country; the root firm, the country is tranquil” (≁ᜏ
䛖ᵜ, ᵜപ䛖ሗ, minwei bangben, bengu bangning); “unity between heaven 
and man” (ཙӪਸа , tianren heyi); “all-inclusiveness” (ެᇩᒦव , 
jianrong bingbao); or the Mencian ≁䍥ੋ䖫 (mingui junqing), which pro-
nounces the precedence of people’s interests over those of the state 
or the ruler [V, 104–105].  
In addition to specific theoretical concepts in Party use, several 
political strategies, mechanisms, and even decisions of past com-
munist leaders are also ascribed roots in YCW. For example, the revo-
lutionary attitude of the peasant class as captured in the spirit of the 
Yan’an period is interpreted as an echo of Mohist thought [XI, 15]. 
Comparative analysis carried out by one of the authors claims to have 
uncovered the spirit of the Doctrine of the Mean in Deng’s decision 
to restore college entrance examinations shortly after the Cultural 
Revolution; the author sees this decision as echoing the Northern 
Song dynasty scholar Zhang Zai’s insistence on moderation and Zhu 
Xi’s emphasis on study and self-cultivation [LXI, 43–44]. The 
Confucian idea of moderation – the Doctrine of the Mean – is also 
allegedly the strategic fundament behind the “one country, two sys-
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tems” principle, the formula for the transition of Hong Kong from 
British to People’s Republic of China jurisdiction [XV, 50]. Even 
Deng’s “cat theory” (⥛䇪, maolun) is said to have been borrowed 
from a “millennia-old folk proverb” – arguably the very reason it 
resonated positively within society [XXVII, 70–71].   
3ROLWLFDO&UHGHQWLDOV,,3DUW\&RQJUHVVHV
3ROLWEXUR6WXG\6HVVLRQV;L¶V6SHHFKHV
Crucially, the political credentials of the YCW narrative are created by 
showing how it is being created and validated by contemporary polit-
ical leaders. Official statements, conference communiqués, and meet-
ing reports help to determine what the authoritative sources are and 
to pinpoint the chronology of the building of the YCW narrative by 
the Party. According to the articles analysed, the central government’s 
message about YCW comes from two main sources: the last two CCP 
national congresses and the collective study sessions of the Political 
Bureau (Politburo) of the 18th Central Committee.  
Mentioned or discussed by more than half of all analysed articles, 
the 2012 Report of the 18th Party Congress is the most quoted docu-
ment openly referencing the revival of traditional culture for the ad-
vantage of the CCP. The central axis of said report is the idea of 
“China’s national rejuvenation” (ѝॾ≁᯿Տབྷ༽ޤ, Zhonghua minzu 
weida fuxing) expressed through the notion of the “China Dream” (ѝ
ഭỖ, Zhongguo meng). These notions are complemented by the slogan 
“three advocacies” (йњّሬ, sange changdao), which provides a new 
definition of “socialist core values” (⽮ՊѫѹṨᗳԧ٬㿲, shehuizhuyi 
hexin jiazhiguan; hereafter, SCV). This report is seen as a call for con-
structing “socialist cultural power” through strengthening the moral 
quality of citizens, enriching the spiritual life of the people, and mak-
ing Chinese culture more competitive as a source of social values 
[XII, 312]. Importantly, improving social morality should be effected 
by a two-pronged strategy of combining the rule of law and the rule 
of virtue [LXXXIX, 218]. Authors provide an extensive discussion on 
the moral education of citizens in the context of this report, because 
it is understood to make a strong association between the moral state 
of society and national governance [XXV, 9]. All this leads to the 
18th Party Congress being dubbed a “new historical starting point,” 
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marking the resurrection of Chinese tradition – whose mission is to 
mitigate the negative consequences of globalisation [LXXXXVII, 28].  
The Report of the 18th Party Congress is on occasion comple-
mented by mentions of Party meetings and documents from before 
the selection of Xi as Party leader. This tactic purportedly aims to 
showcase a long-term, developmental character to the CCP’s cultural 
agenda. The most relevant of these references, however, go back no 
further than to the beginning of the new millennium. The 2002 16th 
Party Congress is described as having discussed the promotion of 
traditional culture as an antidote to the perceived problem with SCV 
[III]. The popularisation of YCW as a mechanism for spiritual self-
improvement, national rejuvenation, and the realisation of a well-off 
society is also understood to be the main theme of the October 2011 
report on “Deepening Cultural Structural Reform and Promoting 
Socialist Culture” (ޣҾ␡ॆ᮷ॆփࡦ᭩䶙᧘ࣘ⽮Պѫѹ᮷ॆ, Guanyu 
shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige tuidong shehui zhuyi wenhua) of the 6th Plenum 
of the 17th Central Committee [V, 102]. The strategic objective of 
this decision, according to another author, is to explain and interpret 
classical texts for contemporary use, for example by elaborating on 
the traditional roots of notions such as “democracy” and “public 
law” [VII]. Importantly, this document is also credited with introduc-
ing the idea of the CCP as a “loyal inheritor and carrier” (Ր᢯㘵઼ᕈ
ᢜ㘵, chuanchengzhe he hongyangzhe) as well as an “active advocate and 
developer” (〟ᶱّሬ㘵઼ਁኅ㘵, jiji changdaozhe he fazhanzhe) of tradi-
tional Chinese culture [X, 28]. 
In addition, “Xi Jinping’s series of important speeches” (Ґ䘁ᒣ
ᙫҖ䇠㌫ࡇ䟽㾱䇢䈍, Xi Jinping zongshuji xilie zhongyao jianghua) deliv-
ered since the 18th Party Congress serve as a meaningful auxiliary 
resource. They are quoted in nine articles. Examples include Xi’s talk 
during a 2014 visit to Confucius’s home province, dubbed “the Shan-
dong inspection” (ኡь㿶ሏ , Shandong shicha) [XIX, 215], or his 
speech at the National Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference 
in August 2013 – where he called YCW China’s “deepest cultural soft 
power” [XIX], and stressed the need for cultural and historical speci-
ficities of a nation to be respected [XXIX, 28]. Authors also recall 
lesser-known but symbolically significant occasions such as Xi’s 
speech during the National Model of Morality Competition (ޘഭ䚃
ᗧ⁑㤳, quanguo daode mofan), where he directly called the absorption 
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of YCW a “strategic task” in the effort to attune Chinese transform-
ation and the country’s developmental path [XLIV, 34].  
The second quantitatively significant source of political creden-
tials for the YCW narrative are the Politburo collective study sessions, 
mentioned in 18 analysed articles. The most attention is given to the 
13th Collective Study Session from 26 February 2014, which dis-
cussed the themes of developing socialist values and carrying forward 
traditional Chinese culture. It saw Xi praising the wealth of theoreti-
cal and moral resources embedded in YCW – values of benevolence, 
sincerity, and righteousness as well as concepts such as harmony, 
“people as the root,” and datong [XXXXIX, 82]. During this session, 
Xi admitted the centrality of the ethical component in YCW [XXI, 
149], and emphasised that SCV must be based on traditional culture 
[XXIII, 30]. Furthermore, the authors report that this study session 
produced the criteria for the assessment of what merit valuable ele-
ments of YCW for contemporary use [LVI, 59].  
Similarly to the sequence of the Party congresses, each unveiling 
a new phase and a more meaningful integration of YCW into official 
discourse, the subsequent Politburo study sessions also reveal an 
increasingly open and detailed approach to traditional culture on the 
part of the CCP. The 13th Collective Study Session built upon its 
immediate predecessor of December 2013, whose report praised the 
value of traditional Chinese morality and promoted the idea of a 
comprehensive, positive propaganda that combines school education, 
theoretical and historical research, as well as more popular channels 
of film, television, and literature [XLIV, 34]. The 5th Collective Study 
Session of April 2013 is also mentioned. During this meeting, Xi 
directly stated that YCW should inspire solutions for improving Party 
leadership and governance and gave the example of the Confucian 
concept of “clean government” (ᓹ᭯, lianzheng) as a prototype for 
contemporary anti-corruption measures [XVII, 54].  
'LDJQRVLV
The nature of the Party school resources paired with the wider con-
text of promoting a cultural agenda by the CCP give the majority of 
analysed articles a specific task-oriented character. In most cases, the 
articles first diagnose some sort of a state of urgency before putting 
forward YCW-inspired solutions. Presenting their diagnoses, authors 
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do not limit themselves to one specific source of contention and 
often loosely enumerate related issues or point to a core issue linked 
to a wider net of interrelated problems. The buffet of problems range 
from consumerism, hedonism, private interest, and utilitarianism 
[LXXV, 124]; through globalisation, political multi-polarisation, tech-
nological and scientific development [LIX, 7–8]; to the influx of 
Christianity and the increasing numbers of Christian converts in Chi-
na [XIX, 215]. Furthermore, a “cultural crisis of Westernisation” is 
widely blamed for hindering China’s effort to establish its own mod-
ern “consciousness and subjectivity” [XIX, 215], with American ideo-
logical influence compared to “cultural infiltration,” “cultural expan-
sion,” and “cultural hegemony” [LXXXVI, 15]. In addition, China’s 
“national strength” is universally seen as compromised by more than 
a century of both foreign encroachment and domestic conflict 
[XVIII, 54]. Within this cacophony of diagnoses, it is nevertheless 
possible to distinguish three blocks of core issues to which the pro-
motion of YCW is assigned to respond. These can be operationalised 
as value confusion, a social morality crisis, and a governance crisis.  
9DOXH&RQIXVLRQ
The normative perplexity of Chinese society is believed to be caused 
by the neglect of traditional culture in the post-Mao modernisation 
process. Since the late 1980s, the tradition was deprived of its func-
tion as “value carrier” for new generations, causing a debilitating 
condition of “lack of cultural self-confidence” [L, 39, 40]. Value con-
fusion is deepened by the existence of multiple and competing 
sources of values and the constant morphing of ideas; according to 
one author’s reverse logic, this can be measured by a recent notable 
increase in demand for various traditional culture “fevers” (✝, re) 
[XXIX, 30]. In addition, the output of the cultural and creative indus-
tries is blamed for failing to match the demand for cultural resources 
[XXVII, 70]. Contemporary works of art are deemed “insufficient 
and low quality”; at the same time, the ossified and overly theoretical 
approach to socialist culture pushes people towards foreign (for ex-
ample Korean) productions in their daily consumption of entertain-
ment [III, 21].  
In line with the criticism of modern and socialist cultures, the 
overly conservative character of traditional Chinese culture is also 
denounced. One author observes that young people tend to exagger-
  Morality as Legitimacy under Xi Jinping 65 

ate the practising of traditional values, which leads to their misinter-
pretation [XXXIII, 102]. He claims that the popular understanding of 
the pragmatism embedded in philosophies of Mohism but also 
Confucianism, if misconstrued, produces an overly utilitarian attitude 
and an expectation of instant success and gratification. Moreover, the 
conservative character of traditional culture can translate into intellec-
tual conformity, a lack of initiative, or the avoidance of challenging 
situations – while a conservative interpretation of traditional values 
can distort the understanding of contemporary social morality 
[XXXIII, 102]. 
$6RFLDO0RUDOLW\&ULVLV
While value confusion is more concerned with the micro level – that 
is, individuals and their everyday ethical choices – the crisis of social 
morality refers to the macro-level, systemic perspective. Authors 
keenly adduce evidence for their diagnosis from official documents, 
but also draw on academic surveys and popular polls. The aforemen-
tioned October 2011 document on the reform of the cultural system 
is quoted in this context as pointing out the negative impact of the 
society-wide moral crisis on “national construction” [XXXIII, 102]. 
One author reports on the findings of a professional study entitled 
“Research on Social Mentality in China” conducted between 2012 
and 2013 by the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science, which concluded that mutual trust and relationships 
between different social groups were drastically deteriorating [L, 38–
39]. A similar observation is confirmed by the nationwide “Survey of 
the Moral Status of Chinese Citizens” conducted by the People’s Daily, 
which deems the moral state of society – measured only, however, by 
SCV – as “passable” (а㡜, yiban) [L, 38–39]. The deterioration of 
social morality is blamed on the lack of a coherent plan for social 
development under the pressures of economic modernisation, but 
also on the long-term neglect of state-supported education in Chinese 
traditions [XXXX, 179]. In this context, the example of Singapore is 
used to underline that the state should play a crucial role in moulding 
the moral foundation of society through purposefully designed edu-
cational campaigns [XIII, 82].        
 
  66 Aleksandra Kubat 

$*RYHUQDQFH&ULVLV
Within the widely understood domain of political governance, two 
contentious areas are identified: corruption and the growing incoher-
encies within the system, including disparities between Party officials 
and ordinary people. Following the report of the 18th Party Con-
gress, corruption is explicitly acknowledged as having potentially fatal 
consequences for the CCP if not addressed [LXXXIX, 218]. Imple-
menting relevant countermeasures is all the more pressing as, accord-
ing to one author, China traditionally lacks an anti-corruption culture. 
The long history of a systemic “culture of corruption” – in the past 
rooted in strong patriarchal and official norms – is understood to be 
the source of contemporary forms of corruption which severely re-
strict development, deepen social divisions, and cause public griev-
ances, all of which directly threatens the ruling basis of the CCP 
[XVII, 55]. The pursuit of luxurious lifestyles but also excessive bur-
eaucracy and formalism are acknowledged as commonly occurring 
causes of corruption [LXXXIX, 218]. Cases of the breach of profes-
sional ethics by Party members which were investigated by the Cen-
tral Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) further reveal 
formalism and “moral slack” among cadres, as well as the corruptive 
influence of family ties. All of these problems cause values deviation 
among cadres, but also slow down the development of the Party – 
and, what follows, the whole country [LII, 132].  
The second contentious area – growing tensions within the sys-
tem – is seen as a consequence of a “utilitarian trap”: the over-
reliance on economic criteria as a barometer of modernisation, at the 
expense of social indicators. Recalling distinguished Chinese philoso-
pher Feng Youlan, one author argues that the CCP as the ruling party 
should go beyond this basic utilitarianism and widen the remit of its 
governance into the moral realm; furthermore, it should readopt the 
traditionally expressed realm of heaven and earth – which represents 
the universal law of the human universe and the natural world [VI, 
58]. It is explicitly argued that if the values of the Party are not 
aligned with the aspirations of society and are not conducive to social 
development, then the CCP will face social unrest and regime col-
lapse [VI, 55].  
A critical caveat emerging from the discussion on the crisis of 
governance is that the previously identified moral crisis and value 
confusion are said to also characterise Party cadres, not just ordinary 
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citizens. The moral deficit among cadres has a wide range of negative 
consequences for the CCP’s governing capabilities, as well as for the 
ideological coherency of the party state [LXXXVI, 15]. It causes ca-
dres to abandon Marxism-Leninism in pursuit of ideologically “un-
healthy values” such as feudal superstitions, historical fatalism, or 
backwardness [XXX, 13]. Cadres, sometimes intentionally, contradict 
ideals of public service or only pay lip service to Party ideals to gain 
position, wealth, or fame; such value-orientation negatively impacts 
on the decisions that they make [LIII, 102]. In the context of such 
growing disparities, diversifying influences, and increasing inadequa-
cies, cadre-training and Party-building efforts must become more 
focused on adaptation [XXX, 12].   
6ROXWLRQV
Diagnosis centres on the values deficiency and the absence of norm-
building mechanisms as systemic problems of China’s post-reform 
social development. Crucially, it points to critical discrepancies within 
the existing governance model. Accordingly, the solutions being put 
forward are framed in moral terms and focus on YCW-based theory 
and practices which can potentially enhance the performance of the 
Party and its functionaries.  
7KH3DUW\
With regards to the role that traditional culture can play for the CCP, 
three main aspects can be identified. First, for the CCP as a political 
organisation, tradition is seen as a helpful tool for enhancing the 
methods of “Party-building” and “Party-spirit education.” Second, 
for the CCP as an organisation in charge of the state apparatus, tradi-
tion is suggested as a means of improving its governing style and 
administrative performance. Third, with respect to Marxist theory 
and Party ideology, traditional culture is interpreted as both their 
theoretical source and a viable resource for their future development. 
In this context, SCV are discussed extensively.  
Party Spirit 
The usefulness of traditional norms and virtues for the CCP as a 
political organisation is discussed in the context of its value for Party-
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building (ފᔪԧ٬, dangjian jiazhi) [XXIX] and, in particular, Party-
spirit education (ފᙗᮉ㛢, dangxing jiaoyu). A creative and innovative 
combination of traditional Chinese thought and Party theory can act 
as a strategic move – or “blade” – in Party-building efforts [XXX, 
11]. Authors point to the 18th Party Congress slogan “five major 
constructions” (ӄབྷᔪ䇮, wu da jianshe) as a demonstration that the 
CCP needs to improve in areas of ideology, organisation, style, anti-
corruption, and system construction. YCW can help in this effort by 
enriching the “ruling theory” of the CCP [XXIX, 31], strengthening 
“the cultural power of the ruling party,” and by expanding its “cultur-
al soft power” (᮷ॆ䖟ᇎ࣋, wenhua ruan shili) [XXX, 10]. Drawing on 
traditional ideas can enlarge the very discipline of Party construction, 
while expanding the scope of Party theory can make it less isolated 
and less self-referential [XCVII, 29]. Such an application of YCW is 
compared to the “contemporary use of the past” (ਔѪӺ⭘, gu wei jin 
yong), which elevates Party-building – both in theory and practice – to 
a “new level” [XXX, 10–11]. Without YCW, ideological construction 
and Party-spirit cultivation would be incomplete and defective [VIII, 
25].  
Beyond directly enriching Party theory, classical and historical 
content can also prove valuable for strengthening the cultural founda-
tions of the CCP and helping Party cadres to develop the practices of 
mindfulness and asceticism without veering away from the main ideo-
logical line of thinking [XXXIX, 32]. There is, therefore, an “inherent 
logic” in linking Party-building and the construction of a state-spon-
sored system for inheritance, promotion, and education in YCW 
[XXIX, 31]. Interestingly, some authors postulate that Party spirit was 
always rooted in traditional (especially Confucian) culture and indeed 
continuously borrowed from it throughout all the stages of the 
communist revolution, socialist construction, and post-Mao reform 
[XCVII, 29–30]. Others, invoking Xi’s advocacy of YCW in Party-
spirit education, call for greater recognition to be given to the fact 
that the CCP is a political party of dual attributes: both the Marxist 
and the inherently Chinese [XCVI, 36].  
Governance Style 
Despite fundamental differences in their ideological and institutional 
contexts, the ancient governing ideals observed by imperial rulers are 
deemed to constitute feasible solutions for enhancing the governance 
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strategy of a contemporary communist regime. Tradition is said to 
have “timely” value for promoting the modernisation of the state 
governance system and enhancing its administrative capacity [XXIX, 
29]. It should be “logically interpreted” and creatively transformed to 
carry out the “extremely important” task of refining the leadership 
and governance capacity of the CCP [XXX, 12]. The idea of borrow-
ing from tradition to enhance governance practices is attributed to 
the Central Committee document from October 2011 entitled “Mod-
ernisation of the National Governance System and Governing Abil-
ity” (ഭᇦ⋫⨶փ㌫઼⋫⨶㜭࣋⧠ԓॆ, Guojia zhili tixi he zhili nengli 
xiandaihua), which is understood to underscore China’s right to de-
termine and pursue its own style of governance specific to its unique 
historical and cultural experience [XXIX, 28–29].  
Comments in this domain revolve around Xi’s innovation on the 
traditional concept of “people-oriented governance.” Referring to the 
Book of History and to Mencius, this concept is described as a proto-
democratic element embedded in classical thought; together with the 
ideal of harmony, it provides the basis for the current expansion of 
space for public opinion and popular engagement in policymaking 
processes [LXXXIII, 47–48]. While previous Party leaders are depict-
ed as having approached people-oriented governance solely as a gen-
eral guiding principle, the current leadership is credited with giving it 
a more substantial and practical role as a governing principle 
[LXXXV]. One author elaborates that the idea of “people-centred 
governance,” which originated in the Shang and Zhou dynasties, has 
been passed on through history to modern times where it received a 
new incarnation with each new CCP leader: Mao’s insistence on 
“proximity to the masses” (ᇶ࠷㚄㌫㗔Շ, miqie lianxi qunzhong) and 
the idea of “serving the masses” (ѪӪ≁ᴽ࣑, wei renmin fuwu); Deng’s 
“I am the son of the Chinese people” (ᡁᱟѝഭӪ≁Ⲵݯᆀ, wo shi 
Zhongguo renmin de erzi); Jiang’s “representing the fundamental interests 
and the overwhelming majority of the people” (ԓ㺘ᴰᒯབྷӪ≁㗔Շ
Ⲵṩᵜ࡙⳺ , daibiao zui guangda renmin qunzhong de genben liyi); Hu 
Jintao’s “New Three People’s Principles” (ᯠй≁ѫѹ, xin sanmin 
zhuyi) showing concern for the people and using power for their bene-
fit; and, finally, Xi’s idea of “people as the centre” (ԕӪ≁Ѫѝᗳ, yi 
renmin wei zhongxin), which encapsulates the tenor of his development 
model [LXXXV, 93].  
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The adoption of the classical ideal of people-oriented govern-
ance as a contemporary governing principle must be paired with its 
implementation and enactment by the political system. This can be 
effected by grounding the policymaking processes in the mechanisms 
of “grass-roots deliberative democracy” (สቲॿ୶≁ѫ, jiceng xieshang 
minzhu). The consultative model has already proven its effectiveness 
in channelling public opinion and facilitating the exercise of citizens’ 
political rights; by producing a “sense of gain” among citizens and 
decreasing social tensions, it serves to secure the ruling status of the 
CCP [LXXXV, 92–94]. Such mechanisms of democratic consultation, 
supported by the socialist rule of law, replaced the traditional govern-
ance model wherein governing principles were enacted by a virtuous 
and benevolent but individual ruler; in other words, Xi’s realisation of 
the idea of people-centred governance is praised for relinquishing the 
authoritarian elements of the ancient Chinese governance model 
[LXXXV, 94]. 
Marxist Theory 
Similar enthusiasm is expressed in relation to the prospect of amal-
gamating the elements of traditional Chinese culture and philosophy 
with Marxist theory. Repeating the arguments used in their discussion 
of governance, the authors praise Xi for devising the formula of “cre-
ative transformation and innovative development” to accommodate 
Chinese tradition in Marxist theory. The theoretical ingenuity of this 
formula is likened to the “third leap of Marxism in China” [LVI, 59], 
which puts it in the same order of magnitude as the sinification of 
Marxism carried out by Mao and also Deng’s inventive redefinition of 
Party ideology into the theory of socialism with Chinese characteris-
tics. What is more, adopting YCW constitutes not only a new “leap” 
in Marxist theory but possibly the only feasible path for the future 
evolution of Marxism in China. Echoing the deliberations of the early 
communist movement, the articles discuss the degrees of compatibil-
ity of Marxism and Confucianism. Both are described as “strong, 
inclusive, and open” philosophical theories, with the former deemed 
the “universal law” and the latter a “natural and social law” [XCVI, 
38]. Reverberating Deng’s 1991 comment on “not losing the ances-
tors” (㘱⾆ᇇн㜭ђ, laozuzong buneng diu), the former propaganda 
czar Liu Yunshan is depicted as a staunch supporter of retaining the 
idea of the CCP’s dual ancestry. According to Liu, forsaking Marxism 
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would equal neglecting the fundamental ideals of the Party; losing 
YCW would be tantamount to losing a “spiritual lifeline” [XXX, 11]. 
Whichever intellectual tradition is proposed to take the lead, the-
oretical syncretism is seen to have a positive influence on political 
thought and socialist ideology [LXV]. Traditional political ideas, par-
ticularly those of Confucian provenance, are seen as possessing a 
strong propagandistic potential which could help to revive socialist 
theory, for example by providing a more accessible and animated 
explanation of socialist values [LXV, 80–81]. In an evident attempt to 
give weight to this line of argumentation, the famous slogan of the 
late-Qing dynasty Self-Strengthening Movement “Chinese substance, 
Western application” (ѝᆖѪփ, 㾯ᆖѪ⭘, Zhongxue weiti, xixue wei-
yong) is symbolically rephrased as 傜փѝ⭘ (傜ݻᙍѫѹѪփ, ѝഭՈ
⿰Ր㔏᮷ॆѪ⭘ , Makesizhuyi weiti, Zhongguo youxiu chuantong wenhua 
weiyong; “Marxism as foundation, China’s excellent traditional culture 
for practical use”) [XI].  
SCV 
The influence of YCW on Party ideology is framed almost exclusively 
as an influence on SCV, a concept introduced by Xi at the 18th Party 
Congress. These 12 values enacted on the individual, social, and na-
tional levels promote the “Citizen Basic Ethical Code” (ޜ≁สᵜ䚃
ᗧ㿴㤳, gongmin jiben daode guifan) and as such, according to the articles 
analysed, are inseparable from the promotion of YCW [XXXVIII, 56]. 
The notion of SCV is understood to build upon the 17th Party Con-
gress’s emphasis on the morality of Party cadres and citizens encapsu-
lated in the guidelines set out in the “Eight Virtues and Eight Shames” 
(ޛ㦓ޛ㙫, ba rong ba chi), also closely related to YCW [IX, 42].  
Significant effort has been put into proving that SCV and YCW 
complement each other; this, in turn, reveals how authors understand 
the division of labour between these two concepts. While SCV are 
seen as a “barrier to safeguarding national ideological security” and 
the realisation of the China Dream [LIV, 32], YCW is construed as 
the factor strengthening cultural identity and promoting social justice 
[LXXXIII]. SCV are enhanced by the traditional ethical, educational, 
and theoretical wisdom that the YCW embodies [LXXIV 81]. Fur-
thermore, authors endeavour to legitimise their reference to YCW by 
retracing the traditional lineage of SCV. At the individual level, SCV 
are described as building upon Confucian ideals such as benevolence, 
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self-cultivation, or junzi – an exemplar of morality and moral conduct 
[XVI, 106]. Harmony, civilisation, and patriotism are interpreted as 
traditional notions adopted in the SCV canon to denote the state–
society relationship [XVI]. Patriotism owes its uniting, spiritual di-
mension to the Confucian ideal of loyalty; reform and innovation are 
motivated by traditional orientations around betterment and growth; 
and, current development is built upon the classical virtues of justice 
and honesty [XXIII, 31–32]. In other words, YCW is described as a 
proto-version of SCV – containing timeless solutions that can im-
prove social cohesion, the state governance model, and indeed the 
Party leadership [XXX, 11].  
Notably, much attention is given to the mechanisms of modify-
ing societal behaviour and inducing thought compliance modelled 
after traditional rituals. The culture of Western Zhou – whose strong 
emphasis on ritual facilitated the inculcation of ethical prescriptions 
into society, and thus created an orderly and harmonious social sys-
tem – is described as a “feasible” direction for thinking about the 
institutionalisation of behaviour-regulating mechanisms today – per-
haps in some sort of contemporary ritualism [LIV, 33]. A system for 
promoting SCV is compared to ritualised expressions of benevolence, 
and intervention into the private and public sphere by the party state 
is seen as originating in the concept of the unity of heaven and man 
[XXXVIII, 56–57].  
In addition to ritual, the repertoire of mechanisms for societal 
control include education and, in particular, moral instruction. Invok-
ing the example of the Confucian codification of moral education and 
virtue-based governance, one author states that the “practice of SCV 
cannot be separated from moral education” [LXV, 80]. In order to 
establish SCV as a “universal moral view” and promote society-
oriented ethics – especially its elements with order-reproducing and 
order-sustaining qualities – a comprehensive system of family, school, 
and social education must be established [XXV]. Furthermore, strate-
gies for improving people’s “spiritual condition and modern citizen-
ship” should innovate on the formula of familiar cultural activities 
such as traditional festivals, which should play the role of “subtle 
educational methods” [XVI, 105–106]. These should become long-
term projects involving experts, new technologies, the existing propa-
ganda infrastructure, and local cultures as intermediaries in promoting 
YCW and SCV [LXXIII, 35–36].  
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With regards to Party cadres, deliberations centre on the problems of 
corruption, morality, and education as well as the inherent interrelat-
edness of these three domains. Discussion on the moral performance 
of cadres (or lack thereof) to a large extent substitutes for a direct 
discussion on cadre corruption. Correspondingly, the anti-corruption 
measures are redressed as the promotion of moral improvement and 
virtue-infused governance. In this process, education in traditional 
culture and morality is intended to prevent undesirable behaviour on 
the part of cadres and to turn them into propagators of YCW.   
Corruption
As stated previously, the articles convey a sense of urgency in intro-
ducing the anti-graft agenda by referring to normative comments 
made by Xi. During the very first Politburo collective study session 
under his leadership, Xi is quoted as having warned that corruption 
was a major factor behind the collapse of many imperial rulers and 
contemporary states [XVII, 54]. During a 2013 CCDI meeting, he 
called for fighting corruption at all levels of the Party (㣽㵷㘱㱾а䎧
ᢃ, canying laohu yiqi da; fight both the flies and the tigers) and said that 
improving the conduct of Party members must be based on the rule 
of law as well as draw on traditional culture [XC, 406]. Xi’s comment 
that curbing corruption must involve “active cooperation of cultural 
thought” [LXXXIX, 218] is taken to denote complementary roles for 
moral and legal anti-corruption measures. In relation to the Party 
itself, it translates into a stronger emphasis on the “organic combina-
tion” of Party spirit and Party discipline in cadre work and education 
[LXXXIX, 219]. On many other occasions, Xi is quoted as calling for 
“mirroring” solutions from Chinese history in anti-corruption work 
and Party construction efforts [LXXXIX, 219]. 
Analysed articles show a visible tendency to equate the essence 
of Xi’s anti-corruption drive with building “clean government” (ᓹ᭯, 
lianzheng). However, despite the importance of this notion in the 
YCW narrative, it is not elaborated on in more detail and serves solely 
as an umbrella term denoting a morally infused discourse on corrup-
tion. The more meaningful illustrations of this concept resort to his-
torical cases to exemplify its potential. For example, the Qin dynasty 
is described as having formed a loyal corps of officials by institution-
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alising moral performance as a professional standard [XXVIII, 49]. 
The selection and appointment system rewarded the moral quality of 
individuals and examined the knowledge of and conformity to the 
official ethical code; moreover, strict hierarchical supervision ensured 
the prompt removal of corrupt officials – thus preventing moral de-
cay among the lower bureaucratic strata [XXVIII , 49].  
Some authors put forward rather adventurous propositions for 
making moral proficiency an integral part of the existing accountabil-
ity and evaluation system for cadres. One such suggestion is to emu-
late the ancient bureaucratic systems which recorded officials’ “mer-
its,” as a way of inducing their self-discipline and self-cultivation. 
“Morality files” recording the professional, social, family, and person-
al moral performance of officials could be kept as part of the assess-
ment process which decides about promotions or downgrades [LII, 
133]. Quoting Singapore as an example, proposals go even further 
and suggest instituting a “virtue and salary” relationship [LII, 132]. 
Another proposal suggests the bureaucratic moral creed should be 
systematised in the form of a manual which would not only officialise 
the merger of legal and ethical measures in cadres’ professional code 
[LIII, 103] but would also “curb extravagance” and promote the 
“habit of thrift” [LXXXIX, 219].  
Moral Education of Cadres
A normative interpretation attributes graft among Party cadres to a 
lack of “cultivation work” and inadequate moral construction 
[XXVIII, 47]. Such circumstances must be countered with an ade-
quate response; namely, supplementing ideological and theoretical 
training with education in traditional morality, ideals, and beliefs 
[XCVII, 30]. As previously, authors stretch their argumentative mus-
cles in their attempts to validate this postulate. Of particular relevance 
in this context is Xi’s “important speech” given on the commence-
ment of the autumn semester at the Central Party School in 2013. It 
explicitly underlined that ethical learning helps one to properly grasp 
the meaning of “honours and disgraces” and develop the ability to 
“tell right from wrong” [LXXX, 244].  
Furthermore, three documents are understood by authors to 
have officially anchored the question of ethics in cadre education. 
The November 2016 Central Committee document entitled “Several 
Guidelines on the Political Life of the Party in the New Situation” (ᯠ
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ᖒ࣯лފ޵᭯⋫⭏⍫㤕ᒢ߶ࡉ, Xinxingshi xia dangnei zhengzhi shenghuo 
ruogan zhunze) is seen as a reminder that communist beliefs do indeed 
include moral ideals – and that in addition to ideological and theoreti-
cal construction the Party also requires moral construction too 
[XCVII, 30]. The basic content of this moral construction should 
draw on traditional Chinese virtues – such as the Confucian “Eight 
Cardinal Virtues” ޛᗧbade) – which are often seen as fundamental-
ly consistent with communist morality.  
The second document – “Notice Regarding Strengthening Edu-
cation in Ideals, Beliefs, and Moral Conduct in Cadre Education and 
Training” (ޣҾ൘ᒢ䜘ᮉ㛢ษ䇝ѝ࣐ᕪ⨶ᜣؑᘥ઼䚃ᗧ૱㹼ᮉ㛢Ⲵ䙊
⸕, Guanyu zai ganbu jiaoyu peixun zhong jiaqiang lixiang xinnian he daode 
pinxing jiaoyu de tongzhi), issued in July 2014 by the Central Organisa-
tion Department – explicitly calls, meanwhile, for cadre training to 
pursue the study of distinctively Chinese concepts such as the above-
mentioned people-oriented governance, benevolence, sincerity, right-
eousness, and datong – the ideal of social harmony and unity [LII, 
130]. The third and final document – entitled “Guidelines on Integri-
ty and Cultivation of the Chinese Communist Party” (ѝഭޡӗފᓹ
⌱㠚ᖻ߶ࡉ , Zhongguo gongchandang lianjie zilu zhunze) from October 
2015 – is given as an example of merging the Party’s own traditions 
with traditional moral values. It stipulates that training should teach 
cadres how to avoid extravagance, persist through hardships, make 
sacrifices for others, and yield power responsibly – as well as how to be 
self-conscious, honest, and an exemplary family member [XCVI, 38].  
Numerous proposals are put forward on how to incorporate 
YCW into the cadre study curriculum and training regime. The most 
radical propose to put courses on the classics on a par with those on 
Marxism in all Party schools, administrative colleges, and other cadre 
training institutions [LXXII, 12]. It is suggested that cadres should 
directly read, interpret, and comment on canonical texts such as the 
Dao De Jing, Analects, Mencius, Great Learning, or Doctrine of the Mean 
[XCVII, 32]. Self-cultivation, with or without reference to Liu Shaoqi, 
is still seen as a very effective method of training and disciplining 
cadres [LXXX]. Furthermore, the authors discuss the grand question 
of the effect that the teaching of YCW may have on education in 
Party theory and ideology. It is proposed that, for educational pur-
poses, YCW should be interpreted in terms of contemporary Party 
ideals such as patriotism, serving the community, or a sense of service 
  76 Aleksandra Kubat 

to and responsibility for the country [LXXV, 124]. Courses on YCW 
should also explain the “philosophical connotations” of Marxist-
Leninist values and ideals as embedded in ideological education, 
many of which have their roots in YCW [LIX, 8]. At the same time, it 
is strongly underlined that elevating traditional culture by “organically 
integrating [it] into ideological and political education in Party 
schools” [LIX] is not meant to replace Marxism with Confucianism 
as the Party ideology [XCVII, 32]. Interestingly, this is the only in-
stance where this ideologically contentious issue is explicitly ad-
dressed. 
Among the wealth of commentaries and recommendations 
made, only one article presents an existing case of YCW teaching. A 
course organised by the Jinan Municipal Party School in Shandong 
Province is analysed based on a simple survey conducted in 2016 with 
a group of 170 attendees [LXXXVII]. It shows that almost 90 per 
cent of cadres believe that traditional culture is “very useful” or “use-
ful” for contemporary society, and almost 80 per cent believe that it 
holds a “very high” or “high” relevance to their own work and per-
formance [LXXXVII, 43]. The survey responses reveal that cadres 
strongly associate traditional culture with the CCP’s related terminol-
ogy and concepts such as China Dream (59.2 per cent), SCV (65.6 
per cent), cultural soft power (58.6 per cent), or Xi’s notion of “cul-
tural self-confidence” (᮷ॆ㠚ؑ , wenhua zixin) (73.9 per cent) 
[LXXXVII, 44]. Furthermore, the survey reveals the levels of famil-
iarity of cadre with Chinese classics such as the Analects – with almost 
55 per cent of respondents claiming they have read parts of this 
book, while circa 12 per cent claim they have never read it. Other 
findings provide valuable pointers for designing similar courses in 
future. They show that for almost all cadres, printed text (books and 
newspapers alike) and “computers” are the main channels of system-
atic (daily) study – while mobile technology is the most popular me-
dium for occasional learners [LXXXVII, 45].      
&RQFOXVLRQV
What emerges from the Party school resources is a quasi-moral narra-
tive which aims to subsume both the political and societal domains 
under the same common normative denominator. Moreover, it aims 
to establish the normative lineage of contemporary Chinese politics 
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by associating it with China’s historical and philosophical heritage. 
For the Chinese Communist Party, the necessity of countering the 
existing widespread value deficit is unanimously assigned paramount 
importance. Crucially, such a diagnosis applies equally to the Party, 
the general public, as well as to Party members and cadres too. The 
deficiencies of the party state are expressed in terms of abstract moral 
norms and ideals, a manner of discussion that often acts as a substi-
tute for the direct treatment of these problems. Notably, the problem 
of corruption is seen as emanating from the low moral quality of 
cadres as individuals rather than being caused by systemic factors. 
Mirroring the normative orientation of the diagnosis, solutions focus 
on moral cultivation through cultural education. The proposed en-
hancements to Party theory and Party-building work – answers to 
problems such as an incoherent official ideology and the waning or-
ganisational ethos of the CCP – are based on the incorporation of 
elements of tradition.Furthermore, the proposals for improving the 
governance mechanisms of the party state are expressed through 
traditional philosophical terms which possess strong ethical under-
tones (“clean government,” or governance based on “people as foun-
dation”). These rhetorical strategies allow the various authors to paint 
an image of the Party, its policies, and its governance model as guided 
by moral reflection and care for society.    
In painting this image, however, authors conveniently dismiss 
the programmatic anti-traditionalism of the communist movement 
and the past periods of radical iconoclasm in the history of the CCP. 
Only nominal reference is made to the New Culture Movement (17 
mentions across 10 articles), the May Fourth Movement (15 mentions 
across 14 articles), the Cultural Revolution (5 mentions across 3 arti-
cles), or the anti-Confucian campaign of the mid-1970s (ᢩᆄ, pi Kong 
and ݂ᢩ, pi Ru receive each only 2 mentions). Listed alongside other 
historical events, their role is limited to that of a chronological cae-
sura in the short sketches praising the development of the communist 
polity and socialist values. These brief mentions do not convey the 
fanaticism of the ideologically fuelled anti-culturalism that character-
ised the CCP throughout most of the twentieth century. Only three 
articles openly comment on this matter; even then, only briefly. One 
article calls for not avoiding the discussion on the historical anti-
traditionalism of the above events [VIII]. Another identifies Mao’s 
“mistakes in ideological work” as the reason behind the Cultural 
  78 Aleksandra Kubat 

Revolution [LXV]. The longest comment is a six-sentence, mid-
paragraph insertion which explicitly names the Cultural Revolution as 
the period when traditional culture was destroyed; this commentary 
blames the New Culture Movement’s “too simple,” “too critical,” and 
“even biased” stance on it for effectively “strangling” tradition and 
“delivering a fatal blow” to any efforts to accommodate traditional 
ideas and values in the People’s Republic [LIII]. 
Three aspects of the analysed narrative could potentially deter-
mine its political longevity and usefulness for the CCP. First, the 
YCW narrative provides a new dimension for understanding the his-
torical role of the CCP. The current resurfacing of traditional culture 
in public and political life is framed as the realisation of the natural 
order of the Chinese cultural and social universe. Such projection is 
paired with the elevation of the CCP to the role of an exclusive enac-
tor of traditional culture. The Party assigns itself the status of a natu-
ral, default inheritor of Chinese civilisational heritage while at the 
same time claiming the role of being its only legitimate carrier into 
the future. This new-found role entwines the CCP with the narratives 
about the past and projections of the future. As a result, the CCP 
places itself at the centre of China’s civilisational narrative – thereby 
becoming inseparable from discussions on the country’s national 
development.   
Second, the YCW narrative can be construed as an attempt to re-
frame the relationship between the Party and society, with emphasis 
shifting from the ideological to moral terms. In this new understand-
ing, the CCP acts not as an ideological but a moral vanguard. It leads 
the progress of China and Chinese society, which is also defined in 
moral terms. This strategy echoes the mechanisms of imperial ruler-
ship whereby the emperor maintains the normative model while pa-
ternalistic didacticism requires him to propagate it among his sub-
jects. In other words, the goal of the CCP is no longer defined as the 
realisation of communism but as the safeguarding of China’s distinc-
tive values and model of sociopolitical organisation. This shift to-
wards non-ideological content enlarges the ideational domain safe-
guarded by the CCP and, as a result, widens the range of available 
legitimising options.    
Third and finally, perhaps the most decisive factor in determin-
ing the longevity of Xi Jinping’s cultural rhetoric and its function as a 
strategy of legitimation is the centrality of societal considerations. In 
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the analysed narrative, the CCP’s governance style is conspicuously 
made synonymous with “people-centrism.” Considerations about 
society underpin various elements of both the diagnosis and solutions 
presented. The diagnosis focuses on the universal problem of the 
negative effects of social change on societal values, and points out 
that cadres are subject to the same morality-distorting forces as ordi-
nary citizens. Raising the awareness of this shared predicament and 
emphasising that cadres are equals with the masses that they serve 
can perceivably mobilise thinking in terms of the common good and 
national interest – and, as such, have a unifying, stabilising, and legit-
imising effect.  
At the level of solutions, the centrality of societal considerations 
is even more pronounced as the CCP’s governance model is recast as 
people-oriented governance, and the discussion on corruption is 
replaced by the debate on clean government. As the foundational 
commitment of the CCP, the pledge to serve the masses is regularly 
renewed by the Party. The novelty introduced by Xi is that this com-
mitment is currently being reaffirmed by incorporating a vision of the 
relationship between the rulers and subjects which originated in the 
polities of ancient China. Paradoxically, in this new cultural narrative 
of the CCP the societal considerations embedded in Maoism and 
Confucianism are brought together in mutually strengthening inter-
actions which lead to the enrichment and reappraisal of these respec-
tive theories. Tellingly, however, this strong focus on the people does 
not translate into the provision of agency. Society remains an object 
of the CCP’s actions and endeavours; what changes is only that the 
objectives of the Party are now framed in moral rather than ideologi-
cal terms.  
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